Our work titled “MASCAT: Stopping Microarchitectural Attacks Before Execution” has been featured on the Register.

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/01/04/boffins_bag_sidechannel_bugs_before_they_bite/

Once considered the stuff of laboratories and spies, side-channel attacks have become increasingly practical. Rowhammer, for example, is a software-only way to flip bits in one row of RAM by rapidly writing and re-writing bits in another row. Ultimately, it lets the attacker crash a kernel process to get root access.

The trio from America’s Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI) in Massachusetts – Gorka Irazoqui, Thomas Eisenbarth, and Berk Sunar – have published a paper at the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR), presenting what they say is analogous to a virus-scan for side-channel attacks.

As they note in the paper, standard anti-virus software doesn’t detect an exploit for something like Rowhammer, because such attacks are “based on (apparently) innocent instructions.”